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America and Europe: The World of Democracies I

THE Wilsonian ideal of an international order based on a common devotion to democratic institutions and settling its disputes by negotiations rather than war has triumphed among the nations bordering the North Atlantic. The governments are democratic, and the label “democracy” denotes genuinely pluralistic states with regular and peaceful alternation of parties in office. This is in contrast to much of the rest of the world where the word is often invoked to legitimize whoever is in power and where changes in government occur, if at all, by coups or coup-like procedures. In the Atlantic area, war is no longer accepted as an instrument of policy; in the past half-century, force has been used only at the fringes of Europe and between ethnic groups, not between traditional nation-states.

This is why, for half a century, the partnership of nations bordering the North Atlantic has served as the keystone of American foreign policy. Even after the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the Atlantic partnership has remained for the United States the crucial buttress of international order. Beyond the definition of mutual defense of a traditional alliance, the nations of the North Atlantic have evolved a web of consultations and relationships to affirm and

achieve a common political destiny. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, American assistance staved off Europe's economic collapse. And when the Soviet Union became threatening, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was called into being. Its military arm has been an integrated military command; its permanent Council of ambassadors has coordinated allied diplomacy. More recently, globalization has deepened economic ties to a point where investments by the two sides in each other have linked the well-being of North America and Europe in a nearly inextricable manner.

And yet—paradoxically—relations between North America and Europe are beset by controversy. It is not that allied relations have been traditionally idyllic or even smooth. Controversy marked the Alliance's growing pains—as was to be expected when nations which had dominated global affairs for three centuries found themselves suddenly largely dependent on decisions being made three thousand miles away in Washington. During the Suez crisis in 1956, the Eisenhower administration dissociated from its British and French allies and actively worked to defeat them; the Kennedy administration's handling of the Berlin Crisis in the 1960s was greeted with misgivings in both Germany and France; the Nixon administration's attempt to define a new transatlantic relationship in the 1970s was widely resisted, especially by France; and the placement of American nuclear missiles in Europe in the 1980s was opposed by demonstrations all over the continent.

There is now, however, an important qualitative difference. The early crises within the Alliance were generally in the nature of family disputes, having to do with differing interpretations of the requirements of an agreed common security. Today the very definition of common security and, indeed, of common purpose is being questioned. The issue of American dissociation from European colonial interests now seems almost historically quaint. At this writing, it is our European allies who dissociate from American policies outside the NATO area, often demonstratively—from sanctions against Cuba, Iraq, or Iran to America's policy in the Taiwan Strait and the plan to build a national missile defense. While,

in the past, opposition parties in European countries often denounced American deployment decisions, it is unprecedented for heads of NATO governments to attack publicly, or side by side with a Russian leader, the strategic judgments of an ally on whom their security depends. Yet that is what happened when Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Paris in October 2000. At a joint press conference with his guest, President Jacques Chirac, speaking on behalf of the European Union—of which France held the presidency for six months—attacked the Clinton administration's plan to explore revision of the ABM Treaty:

The European Union and Russia have an identical view. We have condemned any potential revision of the ABM Treaty, believing that such a revision will involve a risk of proliferation that will be very dangerous for the future.¹

More challenging was the dispatch of a conciliation team from the European Union to explore possibilities of easing tensions on the Korean peninsula, with a mission the declared opposite of the American policy proclaimed by President Bush barely two weeks earlier. The merits of the two views are not at issue. But, at a minimum, greater patience and restraint in an explosive region where the United States is taking all the military risks would have been in order.

During the Cold War, European integration was urged as a method of strengthening the Atlantic partnership; today many of its advocates view it as a means of creating a counterweight to the United States. The distinctive feature of the European Union military force, which will come into being by 2003, is to create a capacity to act outside the NATO framework. In the same spirit, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer has stated that, henceforth, the United Nations would play a larger role in German foreign policy and, in some cases, a larger role than NATO.²

When the Alliance was formed, its unifying element was a common policy toward the Soviet Union. Today the principal allies on both sides of the Atlantic are seeking to define their own "special relationships" with Moscow. While their efforts are not necessarily

directed against each other, neither are they especially solicitous of the views of their allies. What they seek is to magnify their own options—to some extent as an insurance policy against each other—by gaining Moscow's goodwill.

What passes for a common Alliance policy toward Russia is often a sentimental interpretation of the personality of the current Russian leader—at one time Boris Yeltsin, now (at least initially) Vladimir Putin—leaving each ally free to gear national policy to the psychological criteria it chooses to elaborate for itself.

The disagreements in the economic field are, if anything, even sharper. Major trade frictions have erupted in a variety of threats of United States retaliation against Europe, over bananas and beef, and by the European Union against the United States over American taxation of exports. The two sides of the Atlantic are at this writing deadlocked on how, or even whether, to launch a new multilateral trade negotiation in the World Trade Organization. They disagree over both the substance and the process. On the horizon looms another confrontation over energy policy, especially if oil prices continue to remain high.

Even more worrisome is the loss of human contact between the two sides of the Atlantic, which is occurring despite unprecedented travel. More Americans and Europeans are visiting the other continent than ever before. But they move about in the cocoon of their preconceptions or professional relationships, without acquiring a knowledge of the history and intangible values of the other side of the Atlantic. What the current generation of Americans knows about Europe grows far more out of business deals than political or cultural ties. On the other hand, the United States, about which most Europeans learn through their mass media, is defined by the death penalty, the allegedly inadequate system of medical insurance, the vast American prison population, and other comparable stereotypes.

To be sure, the principal leaders of Europe have used George W. Bush's accession to the presidency to reaffirm their commitment to Atlantic ties. The question remains, however, whether the Alliance is still considered the expression of a common destiny or whether it is turning into a safety net for essentially national or regional poli-

cies. The leaders of both sides of the Atlantic face no more important challenge than to answer this question.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

The drift in Atlantic relations is not caused by specific policies of individual leaders; rather, these policies reflect reactions to four fundamental changes in the traditional relationship:

- the disintegration of the Soviet Union;
- the unification of Germany;
- the increasing tendency to treat foreign policy as a tool of domestic policy;
- the burgeoning of a European identity.

Ever since America's entry into the First World War in 1917, its policy has been based on the recognition that it is in its geopolitical interest to prevent a potentially hostile power from dominating Europe. To defend that interest, the United States abandoned its tradition of isolation after the Second World War and confronted the Soviet Union in a protracted struggle. Europe hailed America's role in both instances even when its missionary zeal and tendency to equate foreign policy with moral improvement grated on leaders whose national history had taught them the virtue of more limited ambitions. The consciousness that the Soviet threat could only be met by a joint effort of the nations bordering the Atlantic and by subordinating largely national interests to the common good spawned the existing Alliance structure—perhaps the most effective in history.

In the process, there developed an attitude on both sides of the Atlantic that went beyond the traditional framework of common defense: the members of the Atlantic Alliance thought of themselves as belonging to a unique and special community of values and not simply as an aggregation of national interests. But the end of the Soviet threat has revived the temptations of both more tradi-

tional patterns of national diplomacy and of domestic politics, as will be discussed later in the chapter.

The unification of Germany accelerated these tendencies. It is one of the ironies of history that Germany should have emerged stronger in relation to its neighbors after each of the world wars it lost than it had been before they began. Nothing proves more clearly the limitations of human foresight than the outcome of these wars. Germany was instrumental in starting the first—though the other European states eagerly seized the opportunity—and it single-handedly provoked the second to achieve European, and possibly world, domination. Had it never fought these wars, Germany would have reached almost automatically the preeminent position, at least within Europe, which it is now approaching on the basis of the strength of its economy and the vitality of its people—this in spite of two defeats, the occupation of its territory by foreign troops, and its partition into two competing states for more than four decades. The debacle of the Nazi period, the country's division, and the fact that the Cold War demarcation line ran through its center convinced the founders of the new German democracy that they must avoid above all any repetition of a solitary national course.

Germany, the last major European state to be unified, became a nation not as the result of a popular movement, but because the princes of the various German principalities proclaimed the state in 1871, following the lead of a Prussia which had defeated them militarily five years earlier. In Germany, unlike in the other major European states, nationalism and democracy evolved on separate—often conflicting—tracks for the better part of a century. As a result, German nationalism frequently had about it an abstract, emotional, and romantic quality.

Above all, it lacked a sense of proportion. This turned the strategic problems produced by Germany's central geographic location into a permanent source of instability for Europe. Before unification in 1871, Germany's division into dozens of small states had, for two centuries, enabled its neighbors to contest the European balance of power on German soil. After unification, Germany moved

to the other extreme, seeking to ensure security against all its neighbors simultaneously. But if Germany was strong enough to defeat all its neighbors if they were allied, it was clearly strong enough to overwhelm them individually. Thus Germany's effort to escape its strategic predicament produced its worst nightmare: a coalition of all the neighboring states against it. Germany has been for centuries either too weak or too strong for the peace of Europe.

In the end, this problem has been solved only twice in German history: by Otto von Bismarck in the first decades of a unified Germany in the nineteenth century, and after World War II by Konrad Adenauer and his successor chancellors of the Federal Republic. Bismarck opted for security via diplomatic dexterity. He sought to arrange the relations of European states toward each other in such a manner that Germany would always have more options than any possible rival, thereby preventing the formation of hostile coalitions. This tour de force proved too subtle and complex for his successors who substituted an arms race for diplomatic skill and slid into the First World War by the excessive flexing of muscles.

Adenauer and his successors inherited a defeated, partitioned, and devastated Germany, whose taste for solitary adventures had been exhausted by two wars. They had learned that Germany's past conduct had generated too much distrust to allow for the Bismarck style of subtle combinations, and that the German romantic tendency would overwhelm the sense of proportion on which the Bismarckian diplomacy was based. In any event, a national diplomacy was precluded by the realities of allied occupation.

As the Cold War division of Germany stretched into decades, the Federal Republic emphasized both its Atlantic and European vocations. It sought security from Soviet military pressures by supporting American leadership in the Atlantic Alliance, and it strove for legitimacy vis-à-vis the East German Soviet satellite by accepting French political leadership on European integration. Playing second fiddle to the United States within NATO and to France within Europe, the Federal Republic emerged a few decades after its unconditional surrender as the strongest military and economic power in Europe and as a key building block of Atlantic solidarity.

In the early stages of the Cold War, there was considerable opposition to the Adenauer course. It was expressed mostly in the Social Democratic Party, which had heroically resisted the Nazis and included among its members some of the most admirable figures in German politics. In the early days of the Federal Republic, its leaders advocated what amounted to a national policy in neutralist garb—in concrete terms, what they proposed was to give up Western military ties in return for unification.

By the 1970s, the SPD (in its German acronym) had come to terms with Germany's integration into the West. Two distinguished Social Democratic chancellors, Willy Brandt and Helmut Schmidt, reinforced Germany's Atlantic and European ties, albeit with a greater willingness to explore diplomatic options with the Communist East, and supported by the United States, at first hesitantly, later with conviction. Brandt's "opening to the East" in negotiations with Moscow led to the formal acceptance of Germany's division and laid the basis for a four-power agreement on Berlin which, in 1971, ended the threat to that city. The lingering interest in Germany's eastern option as a road to unification and a different approach to military strategy on the part of the SPD's rank and file brought down Chancellor Schmidt when, in 1982, he was preparing to implement the NATO decision to deploy American intermediate-range missiles on German soil.

In 1998—after being out of office for sixteen years—the SPD took over the direction of Germany in coalition with the so-called Green (Environmental) Party, whose platform had been historically hostile to the Atlantic Alliance. In office, neither of these parties has stressed the issues that characterized them in opposition—due in part to the fact that the post-Cold War world has overtaken many of the debates of the 1980s.

Inevitably, and independent of the party in office, the new international alignment has brought about greater emphasis on the German national interest. When the collapse of the Soviet Union reduced (and, for a time, eliminated) the fear of military attack from the East and when, in 1990, unification destroyed the East German Soviet satellite, the political balance within Europe and NATO ba-

sically changed. Germany's willingness to accept a subordinate status in NATO as well as in Europe has diminished. As Russian recovery gains momentum, the traditional temptation of special German relations with Russia has reappeared.

Three basic trends are likely to emerge as Germany becomes less dependent on the United States for security and on France for legitimacy:

- A greater assertiveness will become evident within both the Atlantic Alliance and European institutions. Gradually Germany may well seek for itself the role within Europe that France insists Europe should play within the Atlantic Alliance.

- Germany will always be far less prepared to put at risk its links to the United States than is provided for by French prescriptions for Atlantic relations. In that sense, it provides a limit to the implementation of French rhetoric.

- As Germany's relative role and power grow, and as Russia recovers, there will emerge temptations for a special Russo-German rapprochement based on the Bismarckian tradition that the two countries prospered when they were close and suffered when they were in conflict.

These tendencies will not be confined to the governing parties. Not only did the younger generation of Germans not experience the postwar trauma—not to speak of the Nazi one—but the former Communist third of Germany did not participate in the democratic experience until the last decade of the twentieth century. Thus a new kind of nationalism is likely to develop, not militarily aggressive but resistant to discrimination based on a past which the vast majority of Germans never knew and insistent on political influence for Germany commensurate with its economic and military potential.

These trends will tempt other European nations to court Russia, in part as a reaction to American dominance, in part as a counterweight to Germany—though, in such a contest, Germany's bar-

gaining position vis-à-vis Russia would appear to be much stronger. Were the United States eventually to enter the same game, the Atlantic relationship would change its character and become more like the traditional European diplomacy of balancing rewards and penalties.

THE CHANGE IN ATLANTIC AND EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP

The leaders who created the Atlantic relationship had learned in the crucible of the Second World War that divisions among the democracies in the period of appeasement of the 1930s and during the long road to victory had nearly caused a worldwide catastrophe. They launched the Marshall Plan and NATO, overcame a series of direct and indirect Soviet challenges, and laid the basis for the eventual defeat of Communism.

The generation in office or dominating elections in the 1990s in the countries bordering the Atlantic emerged from quite a different set of experiences. Their fathers were reared on confidence in American power and the importance of allied unity. The sons and daughters grew up during the protest movements of the 1960s and 1970s that had at their cores a profound distrust of American power and, indeed, of the role of power in international affairs in general. They identified foreign policy with nonstrategic causes and were uncomfortable with the notion of national interest. The question their attitude raised was not whether such issues are important but whether they can be sustained if the traditional framework of security is neglected.

The generation in office at the turn of the millennium in almost all the countries of Western Europe represented center-left parties that had had their formative experiences in some type of anti-American protest. Even in the United States, many in the foreign policy establishment of the Clinton administration had grown up with the conviction that America had no right to project its power abroad until it faced up to and overcame its own domestic shortcomings or, if it did, that it should do so only on behalf of causes

other than its own interests. Some of them held the view that it was the United States that bore a heavy responsibility for the origins of the Cold War, by awakening Soviet fears through an excessive concern with military power.³

While the founding generation treated the Atlantic Alliance as the point of departure for a union of democracies, the protest generation views the Atlantic Alliance as a relic of the Cold War, if not an obstacle to overcoming it. Thus President Clinton, in a joint press conference with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in March 1997, stated that the "old NATO" was "basically a mirror image of the Warsaw Pact," in effect equating a voluntary association of democratic nations with a structure the Soviet Union had imposed on the subjugated countries of Eastern Europe.⁴ The protest generation's goal was less to strengthen an Atlantic community than to "erase dividing lines." A good example is a speech by Clinton at West Point in May 1997, during which he gave four reasons for NATO enlargement:

- to strengthen the Alliance for "addressing conflicts that threaten the common peace of all" in the new century (presumably ethnic and out-of-area conflicts);
- to "help to secure the historic gains of democracy in Europe;"
- to "encourage prospective members to resolve their differences peacefully;" and
- along with the Partnership for Peace and the special arrangements with Russia and Ukraine, to "erase the artificial line in Europe that Stalin drew, and bring Europe together in security, not keep it apart in instability."⁵

While each of these arguments had merit, they omitted the most important reason for admitting Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic into NATO: to eliminate once and for all the strategic vacuum in Central Europe that in the twentieth century had tempted both German and Russian expansionism. It was left to the United States Senate, in its resolution of advice and consent to NATO enlargement a year later, to affirm that geopolitical truth.

The senators declared firmly that NATO was "first and foremost a military alliance," and that it existed for the purpose of preventing "the reemergence of a hegemonic power confronting Europe."⁶

In the Clinton era, affirmations of the Alliance had a liturgical quality which, step by step, edged the original concept of the Alliance ever closer toward the doctrine of collective security.

The distinction between the two concepts is not a legal quibble; it marks an important philosophical difference. An alliance comes into being when a group of nations decides to defend a specified territory or a particular cause; it in effect draws a line, the violation of which constitutes a *casus belli*. By contrast, a system of collective security defines neither the territory to be defended nor the means or machinery for doing so; it is essentially a judicial concept. NATO is an alliance; the United Nations is a collective security system. An alliance deals with a definite and defined threat and often designates the forces to meet it. A system of collective security is juridically neutral; far from defining the threat, it is obliged to wait for it to emerge before action can be considered.

In a system such as the United Nations, the aggressor cannot be named in advance and has a right to participate in the deliberations regarding its actions; to do otherwise would be to abandon the impartial and quasi-judicial character of the organization. When a threat arises, the participants in the collective security system are supposed to agree on its nature, and only then are they free to assemble collective forces to meet it. In the United Nations, if the aggressor happens to be one of the permanent members of the Security Council, it has the right to veto the determination of who is the guilty party or the collective actions to be undertaken.

This is why both the League of Nations and the Pact of Locarno failed in the 1930s, as has the contemporary United Nations, against the principal threats. The United Nations has occasionally been helpful in peacekeeping, especially when all the parties agree and when the issue is the technical implementation of an agreement. But the United Nations has never succeeded in imposing peace on reluctant parties or on a party backed by a permanent member of the Security Council. When all the participants agree,

the need for collective security is minimal; when they split, it is impossible to apply. When every member of an international system has the same obligations, no country or group of countries has the special obligation which is the essence of an alliance. Though the terms "alliance" and "collective security" are often used interchangeably, the two concepts are, in fact, incompatible with one another.

As a result of this confusion, NATO has in the 1990s been diluted in both concept and execution. A host of institutions has been created, which bid fair to turn NATO into a mini-United Nations. There is the North Atlantic Council, composed of the ambassadors of the nineteen countries belonging to NATO; the Permanent Joint Council, which includes the North Atlantic Council plus Russia; the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, grouping NATO and twenty-eight former East bloc countries; and the Partnership for Peace, in which countries of Eastern Europe—including Russia—are invited to engage in joint training for unspecified multilateral missions. All these countries, which extend as far east as Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan, are represented at NATO summits; all are serviced out of NATO headquarters, diverting the historic Alliance missions into a plethora of multilateral collective security enterprises of vague purpose.

Where is the limit of NATO? And how do these new structures differ conceptually from U.N.-type organizations? To extend the reach of American or Atlantic influence into other regions of the world may be desirable. But is NATO the right instrument for that mission? Seeking to direct this plethora of institutions from the headquarters of a military alliance diffuses NATO's focus and confuses its priorities. The annual summits of NATO chiefs of state are now attended by nearly fifty leaders of the various groupings, including the nineteen formal allies. All this threatens to dissolve NATO into a multilateral mishmash.

This is evident in the way NATO has formalized its relations with Russia. In the so-called Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation, and Security signed on May 27, 1997 in Paris, partly to pacify Russian concerns over NATO enlargement, a NATO-

Russia Permanent Joint Council was created, composed of the original North Atlantic Council plus a Russian ambassador. The jurisdiction of the Permanent Joint Council, required to meet at least once a month, was explained at great length, and its structure guarantees that Russia, if it wants, can have the major voice in setting the agenda. This is because the Russian representative, the Secretary General of NATO, and one rotating ambassador from the North Atlantic Council will chair the permanent council. (Russia is to be permanently in the chair, while the United States presides only one nineteenth of the time.) If Russia fully exploited the opportunities open to it (it has not done so at this writing), North Atlantic Council sessions and Permanent Joint Council sessions could end up merging.

The ambiguous priorities of NATO reflect the disappearance of the immediate threat. As a result, it has become increasingly safe in all NATO countries to give priority to domestic politics over foreign and security policy. Since almost all European center-left governments have disappointed their core followers by carrying out market economic reforms, they are reluctant to inflame the radical wings even further by implementing national security policies identified with the United States. Much of the European resistance to a U.S. national missile defense program replays the 1980 arguments against the deployment of offensive missiles—in some instances, by the same leaders.

The Clinton administration fell in with distinguishing its priorities from those of its predecessors in much the same way as the European left. Though it affirmed the importance of NATO, it did so in the context of values that scarcely related it to NATO's traditional strategic objectives. Nevertheless, in the face of the weakening of historic ties, personal relations between the leaders of the Atlantic nations remained remarkably close during the Clinton administration. Because of the congruence of domestic politics, European leaders saw no contradiction between their personal admiration for Clinton and vocal opposition to many of his policies, which they considered as having been partly imposed on him by a fractious right.

As a result, the most freewheeling and satisfying encounters of Atlantic leaders occurred not at formal summit meetings but at "Third Way" get-togethers of world—mostly European—Social Democratic Party heads of government. The ostensible aim of these meetings has been to seek a middle way between traditional capitalism and socialism. This is why the Socialist Prime Minister of Portugal was invited, and the conservative Prime Minister of Spain was not; why the Socialist Prime Minister of France attended, but the conservative President of France was excluded. President Clinton, in attending these meetings as a regular participant, threw the prestige of his office behind one side in the domestic politics of the countries represented.

Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, there existed a fixed set of foreign policy criteria to which all allies might appeal. It was then generally true that the American approach to foreign policy was somewhat more ideological and missionary, the European approach more traditional and realistic. America thought of itself as lifting Europe's sights while European leaders prided themselves on helping the United States discover the limits of the possible. The relationship did not depend on which party was in office on either side of the Atlantic. A return to such an attitude is necessary if Atlantic policy is to develop a coherent sense of direction.

The advent of a Republican administration will inevitably change the forum for consultation with Europe's leaders. President George W. Bush will not be eligible for Third Way meetings or, if he is, the European leaders heretofore excluded will have to be admitted as well, turning the conference into a heads-of-government meeting. And the leaders of Europe will find, once they get used to a relationship based on congruent national interests, that Atlantic relations will have a more permanent character.

Nostalgia for Cold War certitudes is no guide to a wise policy, but neither is the rote repetition of slogans of Atlantic solidarity in the face of a crumbling underlying reality. A new approach is needed to deal with a set of unanswered questions which are the legacy of the 1990s. Is the Atlantic Alliance still at the heart of transatlantic relations? If so, how does it define its purposes in the post-Cold War

world? How will a unified Europe affect the concept of an Atlantic partnership? Is the Alliance a set of common purposes or a safety net?

THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The emergence of a unified Europe is one of the most revolutionary events of our time. The impetus for it has sprung from a variety of motives, not all of them compatible. Initially, Europe saw integration as a way to overcome the suicidal rivalry that had led it into two catastrophic world wars, and to overcome the economic ravages of those wars by cooperative action. France supported European integration so that Germany would not again emerge as a national threat. The Federal Republic committed itself to the ideal of an integrated Europe as a way of differentiating itself from the East German Soviet satellite and as an emotional substitute for national unity. Britain, heir to a tradition that has historically considered a unified Europe a threat to British independence, went along grudgingly, supporting pragmatic technical and economic arrangements but always wary of any undertaking that might turn the United Kingdom into a province of Europe and jeopardize its special relationship with the United States.

A new impetus for European integration developed when Germany was unified in 1990. To assuage European fears of dominance by a united Germany, Chancellor Helmut Kohl made himself the principal advocate of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which called forth a European currency—the Euro—and initiated significant steps toward a common European foreign and security policy. France supported this process, partly to contain German strength, partly to enlist it in a policy of gaining greater freedom of action vis-à-vis the United States.⁷

Throughout this process of unifying Europe, the United States has played a major supporting role—at first as passionate advocate, more recently as foil. Since the first stirrings of European integration in the aftermath of the Second World War, the United States has strongly endorsed the project and sometimes even urged it on initially reluctant allies. As early as 1963, President Kennedy advo-

cated the unification of Europe in order to bring about a more equal relationship with Europe:

It is only a fully cohesive Europe that can protect us all against fragmentation of the alliance. Only such a Europe will permit full reciprocity of treatment across the ocean, in facing the Atlantic agenda. With only such a Europe can we have a full give-and-take between equals, an equal sharing of responsibilities, and an equal level of sacrifice.⁸

In this view, generally shared by Kennedy's successors, the Atlantic relationship was analogous to a multinational industrial corporation in which influence is apportioned in relation to the responsibilities assumed. The trouble with this idea of burden sharing as the motivating force of the Atlantic Alliance is that it confuses the operation of a partnership with its purpose. Europe, whether it functions as a collection of nation-states or as the European Union, will share America's burden only if its objectives parallel America's own and if it believes that, without its contribution, the common purposes will not be achieved. This has not been the case. During the Cold War, there was indeed a common purpose, but America's allies were convinced at every step that America would carry out its global responsibilities even when its allies fell short. Today the nature of the common purposes is so much in dispute that the question of burden sharing is rarely reached.

The ultimate issue is not technical but philosophical: Will Europe's emerging identity leave room for an Atlantic partnership? Will America's triumphalism over winning the Cold War veer toward hegemony? French Foreign Minister Hubert Védérine has left no doubt that, in his view, the purpose of achieving a European identity is to reduce the dominance of the United States:

American supremacy today is . . . felt in the economy, in monetary affairs, in technology and in military fields, as well as in lifestyles, language and the mass culture products that are swamping the world, shaping the ways of thinking, and exercising a fascination that even works on adversaries of the United States. . . .

In keeping with America's view both of itself and the rest of the world over the last two centuries, most great American leaders and thinkers have never doubted for an instant that the United States was chosen by providence as the "indispensable nation" and that it must remain dominant for the sake of humankind. . . . Americans have no doubts and the more forthright amongst them are quick to remind us that the contemporary world is the direct outcome of Europe's complete failure to manage its own and the world's affairs in the first half of the twentieth century.⁹

Védérine's analysis is not without merit. For much of the 1990s, America's Atlantic policies oscillated between imperiousness and indifference, between treating Europe as an auxiliary or as a photo opportunity. A serious strategic dialogue did not materialize, in part because the United States never paused long enough to conduct such a strategic dialogue with itself. A series of initiatives was undertaken unilaterally and made the subject of consultation—if at all—only after a decision had already been taken.

Whereas American unilateralism has resulted from policy decisions which can be modified, the challenge of European integration to America is structural, involving three key issues: the European Union's image of itself; the impact of European integration on Atlantic relationships; and American attitudes toward the different options for European integration.

In defining their identity, the European states are importantly the products—perhaps even the prisoners—of their historical experience. Centuries of operating a system of competing state sovereignties have taught them that persuasiveness in negotiations depends importantly on the options the negotiator has available or is perceived to have at his or her disposal. Europeans historically associated diplomacy with a balancing of rewards and costs; they have little use for an abstract concept of universal goodwill as a facilitator of diplomacy. Still, European societies are not shaped by uniform historic experience. This is reflected in the different attitudes of Britain, France, and Germany toward the idea of Atlantic partnership and European integration.

During the Cold War, Britain was comfortable with American predominance in NATO because its historical experience differed so significantly from that of its neighbors on the continent. For continental nations, the nightmare has always been hegemony by a powerful neighbor. For Britain, the threat to independence has been associated with a hegemonical power on the continent of Europe; salvation in two world wars arrived from across the sea. In British eyes, the role of the United States in the postwar world appeared on the whole benevolent, and friendship with the United States has been the central theme of British foreign policy ever since the end of the Second World War, perhaps even since the First. This "special relationship" was not a primarily sentimental gesture; Britain had survived the centuries as an island outpost off the coast of Europe by never losing sight of its national interest. In pursuit of that interest, it built an independent nuclear force a decade before France did, a clear implication that there were limits to British reliance on the special relationship.

France, lacking the advantages of a common language with a rationalist system of education, conducts a less pragmatic foreign policy. Its leaders strive to create the impression that French (or European) policy has extracted from the United States what America might, in fact, have been quite willing to concede without pressure. Britain pursues its interests by making itself so much a part of the decision-making process that to disregard its views is almost embarrassing. France has pursued its interests by making it too painful to ignore them. Britain has treated Atlantic relations as a common enterprise; French leaders, flaunting their independence, conduct them as a zero sum game in which one side of the Atlantic or the other is bound to have the upper hand.

It is not that France does not understand the United States' role as the ultimate safety net for French (and European) autonomous policy. Nor do French leaders have any illusions about the relative power position of the two countries. In the major crises of the Cold War—the challenges to Berlin between 1957 and 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, the Gulf War in 1990–1991—France proved a staunch ally; deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Ger-

many in 1983 would not have been possible without the eloquent support of French President François Mitterrand.

But the Cartesian, ultrarationalist education of French policymakers causes them to believe that the United States will understand their somewhat cynical applications of *raison d'état*, and will always respect the motivations which induce France to define European identity as a challenge to the United States, even while relying on it as guarantor of France's security. This high-wire act, tolerable when an overriding danger set limits to the game, threatens to undermine the cooperation of last resort on which French leaders still count even when opposition to the United States has become standard operating procedure on many contemporary issues. The policy of seeking a European identity by challenging the United States works best when only one party resorts to it. If the United States retaliated systematically, as sooner or later it will, the strain with the European Union and, even more within it, could become severe.

Germany navigates uneasily between these two poles. It supports the European Union but, unlike Britain and France, it is not in a position to invoke a successful tradition of diplomacy based on the national interest. Even were it to sympathize with the goals of French policy in the abstract, it lacks the self-confidence to conduct the brazen policy of simultaneously challenging and relying on the United States—or perhaps has too great a sense of realism to attempt it.

The United States has watched the various options being proposed for integrating Europe with a benevolence toward the objective and a delicate neutrality that does not declare itself on the kind of Europe being built. The Cold War orthodoxy that European integration would lead automatically to a strong Europe and a more vital Atlantic partnership is still dominant.

But the time has come to take another look at this core assumption of American policy. For at least two other outcomes are possible: a Europe shrinking from global responsibilities, assuming the status of a mini-United Nations and delivering moral homilies while concentrating on economic competition with the United

States; or, alternatively, there could emerge a Europe challenging the United States and constructing a foreign policy of mediating between America and the rest of the world, rather like what India attempted during the Cold War. With domestic politics reigning supreme and no looming security threat, Europe may feel in no hurry to choose between these options. It may thus wind up merging the two approaches, either of which would, step by step, erode the Atlantic partnership.

The first issue to be dealt with is why the Atlantic partnership needs to be revitalized. What is to be the purpose of such an exercise?

Despite the absence of a commonly perceived unifying threat, geopolitics has not disappeared as an element of international politics. NATO still remains as an insurance policy against a new Russian imperialism. Without the United States, Europe would be a peninsular extension, even a hostage, of Eurasia, drawn into the vortex of its conflicts and a prime target of the radical and revolutionary currents sweeping so many adjacent regions. Without the United States, Germany would lack an anchor to restrain national impulses (even as a member of the European Union); both Germany and Russia would be tempted to view each other as their best foreign policy option.

At the same time, the United States, separated from Europe would become, geopolitically, an island off the shores of Eurasia resembling nineteenth-century Britain vis-à-vis Europe. It would become obliged to conduct the kind of balance-of-power strategy toward Europe that it has traditionally rejected. America lacks neither the means nor the opportunity for such a policy, but adopting it would require a psychological wrench and a huge adjustment in its national mode of operation which should be undertaken only as a last resort.

The test will be the ability of the Atlantic nations to work together on issues more immediate than geopolitical theory. At least three issues confront especially Europe, the outcomes of which will determine the future of all nations bordering the Atlantic. As democracies and practitioners of market economics, the Atlantic

nations have a stake in preventing economic recessions—the stability of their institutions depends on it. They really have no choice except to coordinate their policies to reduce the dangers of a global economic crisis, which is the major threat to contemporary democracy.

The economic challenge is compounded by a demographic one. In almost all European countries, the birthrate will not sustain the present population, which is already inadequate to meet the needs for labor in a globalized economy. With the improvements in medicine, the percentage of those having to be supported by a shrinking labor force will rise dramatically; the overall population of most European states will drop precipitously—and this in the face of mounting demographic pressures from the poor countries at the fringes of Europe to the east and the south.

Then there is the future of the vast region to the east of the borders of NATO and the European Union. The arrangements that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union were, in their nature, transitory, with respect to both the internal arrangements and the foreign relationships. In many of them—the Baltic states excepted—the generation that inherited power was almost invariably drawn from the previous Soviet leadership group, albeit with nationalist credentials. This generation is now passing from the scene.

Confronted on the one side by skillful, persistent, and insistent Russian pressures to draw them back into some sort of organic relationship with Moscow and, on the other, by the prospects of Europe and even of NATO, these successor states of the Soviet Union will be obliged to make some fundamental choices. Chaos beckons in that vast region unless Europe and the United States define a common task and not appear on the scene as potential rivals. Much depends on the future of Russia, its internal evolution and its relationship to the international order, which will be discussed later in this chapter.

The future of the Mediterranean basin is no less a challenge. The pressures of globalization, of demographic growth in all non-European countries of the region, are ushering in a period of ad-

justment and potential turmoil comparable to the post-Communist adjustments in Eastern Europe. Most Atlantic nations, while paying lip service to the problem, avoid dealing with it on a systematic basis or approach it on a country-by-country basis, usually when a crisis is already at hand.

Finally, in the globalized world, the quality of life is taking on increasing urgency for peoples and leaders alike. The advocates of such issues have often isolated themselves by presenting their cause as an alternative to traditional foreign policy and by seeking to vindicate it through confrontational methods. But they have a case even when they stultify themselves by exaggerated, self-righteous rhetoric. Representing only 15 percent of the world's population but more than 50 percent of its GDP, the nations of the North Atlantic do indeed have an obligation to help alleviate global problems for which much of the world has neither the material nor the technological resources. It is in the nature of the subject that they need to do so collaboratively, requiring institutions and procedures without which there can be no successful pursuit of the kinds of nonmilitary goals that have heretofore not figured prominently on the Atlantic agenda.

But what if the cooperative course suffers shipwreck because of the European apprehension that any emphasis on Atlantic partnership will dissolve the prospects for identity? Those who seek identity via confrontation with America must not delude themselves into believing that the United States will remain forever passive when its policies are being challenged as a matter of principle. Sooner or later, it will be driven to defend its interests. Then the nations of the West will be back on the course that nearly destroyed them twice in a generation—this time not by war but by an exhausting national rivalry. Ironically, the upshot of such an evolution could well be a weakening of European integration, because, in the end, some key members of the European Union are bound to reject the risks of growing estrangement from the United States.

A consistent pattern of European opposition to American policies cannot be explained away indefinitely as part of the inevitable growing pains of the European Union, or obscured by ritual

protestations of allied unity at highly publicized, essentially ceremonial meetings. The United States owes it to its values and its interests to make every effort to revitalize the Atlantic relationship and to help it achieve a new set of common purposes, to treat Europe as a close partner, and to consult with it carefully in advance of major decisions. But, ultimately, Europe must be judged, and the American policy toward Europe adjusted, according to the same criteria as apply to other great powers—on the degree to which European policies and American national interests are able to reinforce each other. Future generations must not be able to ask themselves how it was possible for the nations bordering the Atlantic to spend their energies on abstruse debates of identity *against* cooperation when all around them fundamental problems were threatening the very framework of their societies, and the option of cooperation was always open.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND ATLANTIC COOPERATION

One of the obstacles to addressing the core issue of Atlantic relationships is largely bureaucratic: it is the time European leaders are obliged to devote to elaborating the process of integration itself. The complex discussion about enlarging the European Union, adapting its institutions, and devising common legislation imposes its own priorities and schedule. Projects for Atlantic cooperation—or other long-range issues—seem less urgent and, in the absence of an immediate crisis, less important. Day-to-day routine thus takes its toll on the habits of Atlantic cooperation, if only because the United States is excluded—by definition, as it were—from those activities which demand the greatest attention of Europe's leaders.

But even with respect to issues where the European Union and the United States interact, the new structures and the methods by which they operate are themselves becoming obstacles to closer cooperation. As the European Union moves toward a greater identity, the existing pattern of Atlantic consultations will inevitably change. This is a fact of life, and the United States needs to accept it.

The kind of European integration that evolves will importantly affect the process of Atlantic consultation. Three possible approaches are under discussion:

The first is the supranational one publicly put forward by German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer. It implies moving ahead with creating European federal institutions and endowing them with legislative powers. Fischer's proposal of European-wide elections leading to a European executive and legislature is the most far-reaching concept put forward thus far.¹⁰

Such a scheme runs up against the contradiction—in the words of French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine—between “enlarging Europe and strengthening it.”¹¹ Enlargement seeks to expand the European Union to the Russian border (and, in some scenarios, it includes Russia as well). Further integration—“deepening,” to use the technical jargon—is, in some respects, incompatible with expansion. This is because not every member of the projected European Union will be prepared to subordinate its sovereignty to the extent required by complete political integration.

The second is the proposal for a “multispeed Europe.” It would encourage the European Union, with its present core of fifteen nations, to proceed toward political and economic integration while permitting other European nations to associate with it on a less rigid set of procedures. A multispeed Europe would allow plural associations with the integrated core: some could be economic, others military, and all the members of the Union might participate together with the integrated core on some agreed decisions in a specified manner.¹²

Finally, British Prime Minister Tony Blair has proposed a variation on the theme of a multispeed Europe.¹³ Because British public opinion would never accept a supranational outcome, and because Blair wants Britain neither to be left at the fringe of such a Europe nor to give up its close relationship with the United States, the Prime Minister has proposed a confederal Europe without a core group. Its members would be free to form various, more integrated, groupings within it for a variety of specified purposes.

The United States should not intervene directly in European

constitutional debates. On one level, they represent the internal matters of Europe. But since each involves some form of integrated European position, they raise what is evolving into the key issue of Atlantic cooperation. For the process by which the European Union, even in its present form, negotiates with the United States leaves little scope for a creative American contribution. When the United States deals with the nations of Europe individually, it has the possibility of consulting at many levels and to have its view heard well before a decision is taken. In dealing with the European Union, by contrast, the United States is excluded from the decision-making process and interacts only after the event, with spokesmen for decisions taken by ministers at meetings in which the United States has not participated at any level. When America encounters spokesmen for the unified Europe, it discovers that its interlocutors have very little flexibility, because decisions taken by the Council of Ministers can be altered only by going through the entire internal European process again. Traditional channels of U.S.-European cooperation are drying up with respect to economic matters. Analogous procedures are now being proposed as well for foreign and security policy. Growing estrangement between America and Europe thus is being institutionally fostered. In some respects, America's possibilities of consultation with the European Union are less substantial than with other friendly, nonallied countries. A balance must be found between the United States insisting on its views as if it were a member of European institutions and its being so marginalized as to be able to participate in European deliberations only after they are, in effect, concluded.

Many advocates of the supranational Europe argue that the real American interest is to keep Europe divided into national states so as to enhance America's ability to dominate by exploiting European rivalries. This is a misconception. Hegemony is not in the American interest for reasons I will discuss in the concluding chapter. But neither is isolation. A wise American policy will seek to navigate between a Europe abdicating from international responsibilities and a Europe striving for a global role in rivalry with the United States.

Whatever the direction of European unification, a new approach

to Atlantic cooperation has become imperative. NATO can no longer serve as the sole institution for Atlantic cooperation; its functions are too limited, its core membership too small, and its associated membership too large to deal with the tasks ahead, including even some in the field of security.

STRATEGIC DOCTRINE:

EUROPEAN MILITARY CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The subject that most immediately demonstrates the relationship between Atlantic cooperation and European integration is the so-called European Security and Defense Policy, which has led to the creation of a European Force with command structure and political direction formally independent of NATO. Advanced first at the Saint-Malo summit of December 1998 between British and French leaders, the European Force proposal was accelerated immediately after Kosovo at a European summit in Cologne in June 1999. On November 21, 2000, at a meeting of European defense ministers in Brussels, a formal plan for it was announced. According to the Military Capabilities Commitment Declaration, the European Force is slated to reach by 2003 a strength of one hundred thousand persons, four hundred combat aircraft, and one hundred vessels, capable of sustaining a mission of sixty thousand combat personnel for a period of a year. The stress is on the "European Union's autonomy in decision-making," though there is a provision for an exchange of information with NATO which is to be negotiated.

From a long-range point of view, a European military capacity is a logical parallel to the emergence of a European political identity. And such a force is bound to have a certain capacity for autonomous action, much as the various national forces do, whether or not they are technically assigned to NATO. The worrisome aspect of the European Force is that its autonomy seems to be treated as its distinguishing feature, and cooperation with NATO appears to be conceived as a special case.

Kosovo, so the proponents of the European Force argue,

demonstrated the vast disparity in military capabilities between the two sides of the Atlantic. And heavy-handed American conduct verging on the domineering contributed to the decision to speed up the creation of an independent force to regain some means for vindicating strictly European interests.

But the emphasis of the European Force so far has been on autonomy rather than on increasing military capabilities. If one of the motivations for the European Force is to reduce the sense of relative impotence inspired by the high-tech American military establishment, how can that be reconciled with the shrinking defense budgets of almost all the European countries? If existing defense budgets are maintained or reduced, funds for the European Force will necessarily have to come out of projected NATO budgets. Thus the European Force would be a net contribution to allied defense only if it leads to an overall increase in European defense budgets or if it is linked in some organic manner to NATO.

More important, what exactly are the autonomous interests being served? Where precisely would the European Force operate? Since European spokesmen have so far rejected the defense of European territory as a mission, its major utility would be for minor actions at the periphery of Europe in which no major power is involved, or outside the area of NATO responsibilities. Even then, only a very rash group of European leaders would dare to mobilize the European Force without American logistics and intelligence support or assurances of American goodwill. In practice, the European Force is not so much autonomous as it is designed for such symbolic efforts as peacekeeping or special missions involving few risks.

The independent European Force will, in most foreseeable circumstances, have to be coordinated with NATO. And its plan indeed involves an arrangement to use the NATO logistics system. But Javier Solana, the European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, has spoken as if the European Force would be an organizationally distinct group that would negotiate with NATO in much the same way it would with non-NATO countries: "It remains to be seen . . . how to institutionalize the EU's relation with NATO on the one hand and how to institu-

tionalize relations between the EU and other non-NATO countries."¹⁴

In Eurospeak language, it has been repeatedly affirmed that "the EU will only launch and conduct military operations where NATO as a whole is not engaged."¹⁵ In practice, this can mean only one of two situations. Either the United States favors the projected operation but, for reasons of its own, chooses not to participate—in short, a kind of agreed division of labor. This might work, though the American dissociation must not reach a point where it tempts pressure on Europe from powerful countries like Russia. But what if the European Union undertakes a military action with which the United States disagrees? How should one interpret the extraordinary situation in which all members of the Alliance save America and Canada go to war while the strongest member and ultimate guarantor of security stands aloof? Would the European Force then have access to NATO logistics assets, which are, in the main, American? Would the United States come rushing to the rescue if things went wrong?

Behind these military questions looms a political one. Any crisis in which using the European Force is to be contemplated would require a meeting of Europe's Council of Ministers before NATO meets. The American NATO ambassador (or Secretary of State) would then encounter colleagues who have already reached a collective decision and could not participate in the discussion in their individual capacity, thereby creating a European caucus within NATO and imposing on NATO the procedures which already blight America's relations with the European Union. The United States is nevertheless put at risk because of its security guarantees and need for its logistics support. Leaders who question national missile defense for the United States because it might lead to the decoupling of America from Europe should respect American concern about new structures based institutionally on precisely such a decoupling.

The dispute being generated by the European Force bears some analogy to the controversy produced by President de Gaulle's decision to proceed with a French nuclear *force de frappe*. Like the Euro-

pean Force, it was designed to be free-standing and independent of NATO; as now, it was justified as a possible alternative to—really a last resort against—an American failure to fulfill its Alliance obligations, or for the ultimate defense of French interests not shared by the United States. But there are important differences. The *force de frappe* applied only to the nearly inconceivable contingency in which a NATO country would risk nuclear annihilation without American support. The European Force, by contrast, is designed for contingencies most likely to arise—low-level conventional conflicts at the periphery of Europe or controversial peacekeeping missions on distant continents. The *force de frappe* was designed for the solitary action of a single ally. The European Force is designed for actions endorsed by *all* allies without the United States—symbolically a much more fateful step.

I supported the independent European nuclear forces at the time because I was convinced that, in the end, they would provide the basis for a more balanced partnership. In time, the European Force might play a similar role provided it can be related to an agreed political framework. The key issue raised by the European Force beyond the diversion of resources is the need for political coordination between the United States and the European Union, and between NATO and the European Force. This cannot be achieved by reassurances at meetings of heads of government that can only be tested when it is too late. A separate European military force can work only if the political coordination between the two sides of the Atlantic is enhanced. That, however, is the issue the advocates of the European Force are deliberately evading. Absent such an agreement, the so-called autonomous European Force could produce the worst of all worlds: disruption of NATO procedures and impairment of allied cooperation without any added allied military capability and without meaningful European autonomy.¹⁶ If an organic relationship can be established, the European Force could provide a new political flexibility for the Atlantic Alliance, including especially a link between NATO and the non-NATO members of the European Union.

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which are not members of NATO—today Ireland, Sweden, and Finland, tomorrow several countries of Eastern and Central Europe. This reality confers a new dimension to the debate over further expansion of NATO. A properly conceived plan of interaction between the European Union and NATO might be able to achieve security guarantees for countries whose independence and territorial integrity are a vital interest of all the Western democracies but whose formal membership in an integrated NATO military command might prove too inflammatory. It could do so by elaborating a distinction between a guarantee of territorial integrity without membership in the integrated military command. This applies especially to the Baltic states. Were Russia to restore its rule, or even its dominance, in those countries, it would signal a return to the imperialism with which it threatened Europe for centuries and an unacceptable shift in both the European and the global equilibrium. On the other hand, the border of Estonia is thirty miles from St. Petersburg. Advancing the NATO integrated command this close to key centers of Russia might mortgage the possibilities of relating Russia to the emerging world order as a constructive member.

If the European Union aspires to be treated as a unit, it follows that some link must be established between the security of those of its members that are not part of NATO and the military structure of the European Union. If there is one region for the defense of which the European Force envisaged by the European Defense Initiative is organically appropriate, it would be precisely in such states. Nor is it possible in a well-conceived Atlantic partnership for NATO to ignore security threats to member states of the European Union, whether or not they are formally members of the Alliance. Strangely, in view of the frequent affirmations of European identity, the European Union insists that membership in it involves no security guarantees. But is Europe really prepared to claim that it has two categories of members, one category of which it is willing to expose to military attack? What then becomes of the oft-invoked European identity? Or of a security and defense policy that does not aspire to defend its own territory?

The European Union, to be truly worthy of its name, must in

time be prepared to resist by force attacks on the security of any of its members, much as its national states do today. And if the European Union is obliged to defend one of its members, whether or not it belongs to NATO, the United States will not be able to stand by.

The argument that the European Union would decouple from NATO were it to assume some responsibility for the defense of its own territory is, with all respect, nonsense. If that were true, the national forces maintained by members of the Alliance would also decouple their countries from NATO. If Europe becomes serious about defense, the expansion of the European Union and of NATO merge to some extent. These steps are needed: The European Union must affirm its determination to safeguard its territorial integrity. NATO needs to affirm that the territorial integrity of the European Union is a vital NATO interest. Then it will be possible to design security guarantees without forward deployments. An indispensable component of such a policy would be rapid membership of the Baltic states in the European Union even if they do not meet all the technical criteria; a union of three hundred million people should be able to make exceptions for the eight million in the Baltic region if the European and Atlantic interest requires it.

STRATEGIC DOCTRINE: MISSILE DEFENSE AND THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE

Every two decades, a debate about nuclear strategy seems to break out in the Alliance. The subject varies: in the 1960s, it concerned American opposition to national nuclear forces in Europe; in the 1980s, it was about deploying American nuclear missiles in Europe; at this writing, the subject is the American proposal to develop a missile defense system.

The current debate is turning into a test case about whether a serious strategic dialogue within the Alliance is still possible, or whether it will be submerged by domestic politics. The American President's first obligation is to provide for the safety of the American people by deterring attacks on the homeland, on American forces abroad, on America's allies, and to reduce the impact of such

attacks should deterrence fail. A bipartisan commission headed by Donald Rumsfeld—now President George W. Bush's Secretary of Defense—was set up in 1998 to study the danger of missile attack. The commission concluded unanimously that the threat posed by a number of hostile emerging states "is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimates and reports by the Intelligence community."¹⁷ Furthermore, the commission argued, "the U.S. might well have little or no warning before operational deployment" of missiles capable of reaching U.S. territory with biological, chemical, or nuclear warheads.¹⁸

Despite such warnings, national missile defense has become one of those symbolic issues against which elite opinion has rallied for decades, taking little account of the intervening political and technological changes. Five arguments are generally put forward in opposition to a national missile defense:

1. that a workable system cannot be designed;
2. that if it were, it would undermine the strategic doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction;
3. that it violates the 1972 ABM Treaty and would jeopardize the entire gamut of Russo-American relations;
4. that an anti-missile program would decouple the defense of Europe from America, because the United States might be perceived as withdrawing into a Fortress America (interestingly, this argument is never heard from America's Asian allies); and
5. that an American missile defense would promote nuclear proliferation—an argument put forward jointly by President Chirac of France and President Putin of Russia.

Without claiming to be a technical expert, I have been exposed to enough briefings to be convinced that the prospects of missile defense are promising. This view of America's potential is obviously shared by Russia and China, as is shown by their persistent opposition to any American missile defense system. Most of the technical doubts in the West have concentrated on the system developed in the Clinton administration in an effort to remain compatible with the ABM Treaty. It is designed to shoot down a nuclear

warhead in the final phase of its trajectory when it is small, traveling extremely fast, possibly maneuverable, and very hard to detect. This is why most missile defense thinking now concentrates on shooting down the missile during the boost phase when the missile is moving slowly, cannot be maneuvered, and, because of its fuel load, is large and easier to detect.

As for the argument that national missile defense runs counter to the long-standing strategic concept of Mutual Assured Destruction, a reassessment of that doctrine is long overdue, whatever the view regarding missile defense. Advocates of the doctrine argue that nuclear war is best prevented by guaranteeing that the failure of deterrence will produce the most cataclysmic outcome. They therefore oppose any strategy based on discriminating targeting and any attempt to construct defensive systems. Security is sought in an essentially nihilistic insistence on leaving the civilian population, one's own as well as of potential adversaries, totally vulnerable to nuclear attack. In these terms, defense policy turns on itself; in seeking to guarantee the total vulnerability of the population, a doctrine of defense becomes explicitly anti-defense.

This theory emerged out of academic seminars and from theoreticians who would never be required to make the fateful decisions they were urging. It is one thing to theorize about mutual deterrence based on the threat of mutual suicide, quite another to implement such a concept in an actual crisis. Who, in fact, would be prepared to assume the moral responsibility for resorting to a strategy that guarantees the deaths of tens of millions, if not hundreds of millions, on both sides in a matter of days? How can such a strategy be made credible? How can democratic governments implement such a course? It is impossible to believe that democratic governments in Europe, priding themselves on their humanitarian impulses, would in fact carry out their retaliatory threats.

The diplomacy appropriate for such a strategy would have to be designed to demonstrate that, when security is involved, normal calculations do not apply. Leaders would have to display a high propensity for recklessness to make such a strategy credible. But, in both Europe and the United States, the Mutual Assured Destruction

tion theory is being advocated most passionately by those who started their public life in demonstrations attacking *any* reliance on nuclear weapons.

Whatever tenuous plausibility the MAD theory may have had in a two-power world evaporates when eight nations have tested nuclear weapons and many rogue regimes are working feverishly on the development of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons of mass destruction, as well as on the ballistic missiles with which to deliver them. If one of these weapons destroyed an American or European city by accident or design, how would democratic leaders explain to their publics their refusal—not inability, but refusal—to protect them against even limited missile attacks?

The contrast between the security situation of 1972, when the ABM Treaty was signed, and of today is stark. One signatory, the Soviet Union, has disappeared as a legal entity. Missile technologies have evolved in sophistication and proliferated into nations (North Korea, Iran, Iraq, India, Pakistan) not considered likely candidates for advanced military technology when the agreement was concluded.

Since I have held and published these views for four decades, it is appropriate to ask why an ABM Treaty was signed by President Richard Nixon in 1972, when I served as National Security Adviser. The blunt answer is that, while the Nixon administration started its term in office determined to move away from the MAD concept, it was partially forced back into its framework by congressional and bureaucratic pressures. Early in his first term, Nixon ordered the Pentagon to develop a strategy concentrating on military rather than civilian targets. In 1969, he also submitted to Congress a missile defense program providing for twelve sites to protect missile silos and the population against limited attacks from the Soviet Union, against attacks from emerging nuclear powers, and against accidental and unauthorized launches from any source.

Nixon's ABM program was criticized with precisely the same arguments being deployed against the contemporary programs for missile defense: that it would not work; that it would work so well as to be destabilizing; that it would weaken the Atlantic Alliance by

decoupling the defense of the United States from that of Europe; that it would drive the Soviet Union into intransigence and an arms race.

Amid the passions of the Vietnam protest and in a Congress dominated by the opposition party, these criticisms merged with the prevailing assaults on the entire defense budget. The initial authorization for the ABM passed the Senate by one vote, the Vice President's. In subsequent years, Congress used the appropriations process to destroy what it had narrowly failed to defeat in the original authorization. Each year, the number of ABM sites was reduced by Congress until, by late 1971, only two remained. And the Soviets, aware of these domestic pressures, were stonewalling discussions on limiting their offensive buildup, proceeding then at the rate of two hundred long-range missile launchers a year. In this atmosphere, the Defense Department, acting through Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, wrote to President Nixon in late spring of 1970 that a strategic arms control agreement should be negotiated as soon as possible. Failing that, the Soviets might soon outstrip the United States in strategic forces.

Nixon was far from converted to the MAD theory but, faced with a Congress determined to gut missile defense, decided to freeze—and thereby to preserve—a nucleus ABM deployment in return for equivalent limits on the Soviets' own missile defense, and to use that decision to put a ceiling on the Soviet offensive buildup. At the Moscow summit of 1972, the Soviets accepted the American insistence that offensive weapons be limited simultaneously with defensive weapons. This history is relevant because many who treat the ABM Treaty as the cornerstone of arms control misunderstand the original impetus for it.

In assessing Europe's reactions to contemporary missile defense, it must be kept in mind that the arguments largely recycle what European opponents of American defense policy have been alleging about every major new American weapons program or strategic doctrine for the past thirty years—from Kennedy's "flexible response" in the 1960s, to Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and intermediate-range missiles in the 1980s. Opposing new offen-

sive weapons placed in Europe in the 1980s and new defensive weapons based in the United States in this century, these critics—often the same personalities—have charged on each occasion that the new programs would decouple America from Europe and torpedo important negotiations with Moscow.

In each case, the critics have been proved wrong. In the Nixon administration, the United States ABM program broke the deadlock in U.S.-Soviet strategic arms control negotiations. In the Reagan administration, SDI and intermediate-range missiles in Europe brought the Soviets back to the conference table. The same outcome is likely today—indeed at this writing there are already indications of a Russian willingness to explore some kind of missile defense. Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons in its arsenal. Therefore it will be many decades, if ever, before an American missile defense program precludes an ultimate Russian nuclear safety net, even as it constrains many of the more limited ones. Every opportunity exists, therefore, for continuing a diplomacy designed to make a nuclear conflict between the two largest nuclear powers ever less probable.

Finally, once European critics disenthral themselves from outdated slogans, they will recognize the absurdity of the proposition that an America totally vulnerable to nuclear attack from any direction is the best guarantee for Europe's security. Common sense suggests that the opposite must be true. A United States that is totally vulnerable to nuclear attack is much more likely to shrink from fulfilling Alliance obligations. And these arguments apply as well to the defense of European territory against missile attack.

The argument that an American missile defense system spurs nuclear proliferation makes no more sense. Why should countries not now possessing nuclear missiles be more likely to acquire them because penetrating American territory has become more difficult? Large countries seeking or possessing nuclear missiles and weapons may indeed add to their numbers to defeat American defenses. But even if they are able to sustain that race—which for the so-called rogue states is highly improbable—it would leave America's popu-

lation no worse off against an all-out attack than it is today, and it would have to be at the sacrifice of an adversary's other military options. Without an American missile defense, the calculations of a country seeking to blackmail the United States are limited only by the reliability of its weapons. With a missile defense, the calculations become more complicated. The adversary cannot know which warheads will get through even if he calculates some will. Or else it would require a scale of attack that verges on all-out war.

Many countries, including China, which is not a signatory to the ABM Treaty, have joined the chorus of opposition to missile defense. So long as there is uncertainty about America's decision, that chorus can only grow in intensity. An early American commitment to a program is therefore essential. Within that context, there should be consultation with allies, especially about giving them an opportunity to participate in the defense system and to extend its coverage to Europe.

But, with all respect for the views of allies and other important countries, the United States cannot condemn its population to permanent vulnerability. All this implies the urgent need to clarify the purpose of missile defense, its technology, and the diplomacy associated with it. Partly for domestic reasons, the purpose of missile defense has been defined exclusively as resisting attacks from rogue states, sparking a debate about what a rogue state is or whether the threat is real. But it is important to avow that the missile defense is needed as well against established nonrogue nuclear powers. Given the cataclysmic consequences of even a single explosion, the United States must protect itself to the extent possible against accidental launches, unauthorized attacks, or limited attacks for whatever purpose. Or, to put it another way, the United States needs to raise the admission price of any nuclear attack as high as possible. In this concept, missile defense may be effective against small nuclear powers or reduce the options of large countries to efforts of a scale that they are not prepared to risk, because the consequences would be too unpredictable.

The decision on missile defense having been made, an open-

minded study should seek to determine the most appropriate technology. This had been inhibited by efforts of the Clinton administration to develop a technology that might fit into the ABM Treaty. But were this possible, what would be the relevance of the treaty? At any rate, it has become clear that the most studied technology is probably the least suitable for effective defense. An urgent decision is needed on this issue, unimpeded by those whose vested opposition to defense causes them to demand criteria the fewest new weapons have ever met. Only when the United States has defined its necessities can it conduct a serious dialogue on whether to amend or to withdraw from the treaty. It will also be the most meaningful basis for a negotiation on agreed limits to missile defense and an arrangement on nuclear stockpiles appropriate to the contemporary technology and political environment.

RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

The West's relations with Russia have always been laced with ambivalence. For Europe, Russia was a relative latecomer on the international scene. Backward, mysterious, elemental, enormous, it exploded on Europe's consciousness only in the eighteenth century. In the first quarter of that century, Russia was still fighting Swedish invaders deep inside what is present-day Ukraine. Less than fifty years later, during the Seven Years' War, Russian armies stood on the outskirts of Berlin. Another generation later, after the defeat of Napoleon, Russian troops occupied Paris.

More autocratic than any of the European states, Russia practiced a mystical and nationalistic form of the Christian religion in Russian orthodoxy—a state church which endowed Russia's quest for prestige and expansion with legitimacy. Though Russia participated in the diplomacy of the European balance of power, it did not apply its principles to neighboring countries. It proclaimed a zone of special influence in the Balkans, where it advocated both Pan-Slavism and the right to protect Orthodox Christianity against the Muslim Ottoman Empire, as well as in Central Asia, where it pursued both a colonialist and a religious mission.

Russia has always been *sui generis*—especially when compared to its European neighbors. Extending over eleven time zones, Russia (even in its present, post-Soviet form) contains the largest landmass of any contemporary state. St. Petersburg is closer to New York than it is to Vladivostok, which is in turn closer to Seattle than it is to Moscow. A country of that size ought not to suffer from claustrophobia. Yet creeping expansionism has been the recurring theme of Russian history. For four centuries, Russia has subordinated the well-being of its own population to this relentless outward thrust threatening all its neighbors. In the Russian mind, the centuries of sacrifice have been transmuted into a mission, partly on behalf of security, partly in the service of a claimed superior Russian morality.

Throughout history, Russia's achievements and ambitions have kept pace with its physical dimensions. On two occasions, Russia's vastness and its peoples' capacity for endurance prevented a conqueror from dominating Europe: Napoleon in the nineteenth century, Hitler in the twentieth. But, in the aftermath of each stupendous national effort, Russia identified peace with imposing its autocratic domestic principles everywhere within the reach of its armies: in the name of conservatism through the Holy Alliance in the nineteenth century, and in the name of Communism in the twentieth century.

On both occasions, Russia overextended itself and suffered a shipwreck: in the Crimean War in the nineteenth century, and when the Soviet Union collapsed in the twentieth. Throughout its history, with all its ups and downs, Russia has conducted a persistent, patient, and skillful diplomacy: with Prussia and Austria against the specter of French domination; with France against Imperial Germany; with England, France, and Hitler's Germany to avoid isolation; with the United States and Britain to avoid disaster during World War II; and, during the Cold War, by trying to split Europe from the United States through a combination of nuclear blackmail and the support of movements that portrayed the United States as the greater threat to nuclear peace.

Russia's history has left Europe with a legacy of romantic nostal-

gia for the periods of cooperation but also with a vague dread of Russia's vastness and inscrutability. Many in Germany identify national disasters with the abandonment of Bismarck's legacy of always keeping open a diplomatic option to Russia; France recalls having been saved in two world wars by alliance with Russia. Britain's historical memory is more sober and less sentimental; too much of its history is bound up with resisting Russian threats to the Bosphorus and on the approaches to India.

The historical memories of all these countries are reinforced by the pressure of public opinion urging their governments to act as a pivot between Russia and the United States. This is why some European leaders talk of inviting Russia, at some point in the future, to join the European Union. It also is the impetus behind the efforts of all the major nations of Europe to establish a special relationship with Russia, both to prevent a recurrence of historic pressures and as a hedge against their neighbors doing the same thing.

The American historical experience with Russia has been less direct. In the nineteenth century, Russia was treated as the epitome of European autocracy; after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, it became for many the incarnation of radical evil. The United States did not establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union until the beginning of 1934. In the 1930s, some small groups, spurred by the rise of Nazism, saw in Communism the best barrier to Fascism and the harbinger of a new and more just world order. Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union gave rise to a feeling of goodwill toward the victim together with a sentimentalization of Soviet reality. President Franklin Roosevelt treated the Soviet Union as one of the pillars of an incipient world order, apparently convinced that neither centuries of tsarist autocracy and imperialism nor a generation of Stalinism would pose an insuperable obstacle to postwar Soviet-American collaboration.

The honeymoon proved to be short-lived. Stalin's intransigence, Communist ideology, and the Soviet occupation of Europe up to the Elbe River and dividing Germany produced a reaction of suspicious hostility. International relations became essentially bipolar as the two superpowers confronted each other across a divid-

ing line running through the center of Europe and multiplied their nuclear armaments on both sides of it.

During these forty years of confrontation, a minority in the United States—and somewhat larger groups in Europe—challenged the underlying premises of Atlantic Cold War policy. Sometimes exploited by Communist peace offensives even when independent of them, the advocates of a return to the Soviet-American camaraderie of the war years blamed the United States for excessive preoccupation with nuclear strategy and power politics. During the last two decades of the Cold War, a series of negotiations was conducted with the Soviet Union, mostly dealing with arms control but motivated in good part by the consciousness that, whatever the parties' ideological and geopolitical differences, nuclear weapons posed the risk of a cataclysm threatening the very survival of civilization, and that the two nuclear superpowers had a duty to limit or, if possible, to eliminate it altogether.

These negotiations led to a three-way split of American opinion: a group that believed that the Soviet system would be transformed by the very process of negotiations (or had indeed already transformed itself); a group that viewed Communism as the principal, if not the only, challenge to peace in the world and held that permanent peace could be achieved only by a crusade to bring about the collapse of Communism; and a third group that sought to contain the Soviet Union by a combination of diplomacy and strategy until exhaustion eroded Communist ideological fervor and changed the Soviet Union from an ideological cause to a state pursuing traditional national interests.

The debate among these three groups came to an end with the end of the Cold War itself. But because the first two groups had based their views on the same premise, namely that the Russian challenge was almost exclusively the consequence of the Communist ideology and structure, post-Cold War American thinking about Russia became increasingly preoccupied with the internal changes taking place in Moscow. As Communism unravelled, the relations of the Atlantic nations with Russia were based less on geopolitical considerations than on assumptions regarding Russia's

internal situation. And that, in turn, became identified with the personality of the Russian leader, Boris Yeltsin.

The Western democracies began to act as if Russia's domestic reform were the major, if not the sole, key to a stable relationship. Russia was treated not as a serious power but as the subject of occasionally condescending disquisitions on the state of its internal domestic reform.

Acting as if they were themselves a party to Russian domestic politics, Western leaders during Boris Yeltsin's term in office showered him with accolades, attesting to his commitment to reform. President Clinton, on the occasion of Yeltsin's resignation, spoke of Russia as having become "a pluralist political system and civil society competing in the world markets and plugged into the Internet." He explained Yeltsin's leaving office as "rooted in his core belief in the right and ability of the Russian people to choose their own leader."¹⁹ Almost every other observer viewed Yeltsin's resignation as a skillful manipulation of the Russian constitution in order to entrench as his successor a KGB-trained protégé practically unknown six months earlier, and to protect his own and his family's post-presidential existence.

Equating foreign policy with Russian domestic politics tended to identify the United States in the minds of many Russians with the weird Yeltsin-era hybrid of black markets, reckless speculation, outright criminal activity, and state capitalism in which huge industrial combines were run by their erstwhile Communist managers, all in the guise of privatization. This state of affairs enabled Russian nationalists and Communists to claim that the entire system was a fraud perpetrated by the West to keep Russia weak.

As a general proposition, when foreign policy toward Russia is identified with shaping Russian domestic politics, the ability to influence the external conduct of the Russian state is weakened. Yet it is precisely the external actions of Russia that have historically presented the greatest challenge to international stability. Indeed, the Western democracies, by making themselves so much a party to Russia's domestic drama, provided an incentive for Russia's leaders

to escape present-day frustrations by evoking visions of a glorious past.

Whatever the merit of these views during Russia's precarious transition from Communism and however considerable Yeltsin's achievement in navigating it without catastrophe, the world is now dealing with a new type of Russian leader. Unlike his predecessor, who cut his political teeth in the power struggles of the Communist Party, Putin emerged from the world of the secret police. Advancement in that shadowy world presupposes a strong nationalist commitment and a cool, analytical streak. It leads to a foreign policy comparable to that during the tsarist centuries, grounding popular support in a sense of Russian mission and seeking to dominate neighbors where they cannot be subjugated. With respect to other powers, it involves a combination of pressures and inducements, the proportion between which is reached by careful, patient, and cautious manipulations of the balance of power.

On December 31, 1999, the day before his elevation to the presidency, then Prime Minister Putin wrote: "It will not happen, if it ever happens at all, that Russia will become the second edition of, say, the United States or Great Britain. . . . For Russians, a strong state is not an anomaly, which should be got rid of. Quite the contrary, they see it as a guarantor of order and the initiator and the main driving force of any change."²⁰ Putin explicitly reaffirmed Russia's imperial tradition in his inaugural address in May 2000: "We must know our history, know it as it really is, draw lessons from it and always remember those who created the Russian state, championed its dignity and made it a great, powerful and mighty state."²¹

Both Russia and the United States have historically asserted a global vocation for their societies. But while America's idealism derives from the concept of liberty, Russia's developed from a sense of shared suffering and common submission to authority. Everyone is eligible to share in America's values; Russia's have been reserved for the Russian nation, excluding even the subject nationalities of the empire. American idealism tempts isolationism; Russian idealism has prompted expansionism and nationalism.

This attitude was reflected in a Russian national security policy document adopted on October 3, 1999, when Putin was Prime Minister, and signed into law as one of his first official acts upon assuming the acting presidency in January 2000: "to create a single economic domain with the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States"—that is, all the former constituent republics of the Soviet Union (with the exception of the Baltic states, which are not members of the Commonwealth but which are nevertheless facing constant Russian pressure).²²

The document does not define what is meant by a "single domain," or how such an ambition could be confined to the economic field. Faced with almost unanimous resistance to these designs, Russian policy under Yeltsin, and even more so under Putin, has sought to render independence so painful for the former constituent republics of the Soviet Union—through the presence of Russian troops, the encouragement of civil wars or economic pressure—that a return to the Russian womb appears as the lesser of these evils.

This policy is making significant progress. In Moldova, the Communist Party has won the most recent election. Georgia faces unrelenting Russian pressures: economic, in the manipulation of Russian energy exports; military; and political, in Russian support for dissident groups. Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan face similar pressures. Belarus is already a *de facto* satellite of Russia. And Ukraine is rent by domestic divisions, of which Russia is partly the cause but also appears to some as the solution to the besieged government (which is responsible for some of its difficulties). And throughout its former empire, Russia is extending its domestic influence by skillfully using the process of privatization to buy up industries in former republics of the Soviet Union, thereby magnifying its economic influence.

One of the key challenges to the relations of the Atlantic nations with Russia is whether Russia can be induced to modify its traditional definition of security. Given its historical experiences, Russia is bound to have a special concern for security around its vast periphery and, as discussed earlier, the West needs to be careful not

to extend its integrated military system too close to Russia's borders. But, equally, the West has an obligation to induce Russia to abandon its quest for the domination of its neighbors. If Russia becomes comfortable in its present borders, its relations with the outside world should rapidly improve. But if reform produces a strengthened Russia returning to a policy of hegemony—as, in effect, most of its neighbors fear—Cold War-style tensions would inevitably reappear.

The United States and its allies need to define two priorities in their Russia policy. One is to see to it that Russia's voice is respectfully heard in the emerging international system—and great care must be taken to give Russia a feeling of participation in international decisions, especially those affecting its security. At the same time, the United States and its allies must stress—against all their inclinations—that their concerns with the balance of power did not end with the Cold War. The United States must do more than remonstrate about Russia's support of Iran's nuclear program, its systematic attack on American policies in the Gulf, especially in Iraq, and its eagerness to foster groupings whose proclaimed aim is to dismantle what Russian leaders persist in describing as American hegemony. The United States should respect legitimate Russian security interests. But this presupposes that the Russian definition of "legitimate" be compatible with the independence of Russia's neighbors and that it takes seriously such American concerns as limiting proliferation of nuclear and missile technology.

Russia's internal evolution cannot be treated as the principal answer to the foreign policy challenge with which it has always confronted its neighbors. The relationship between market economics and democracy—and between democracy and a peaceful foreign policy—is not nearly so automatic as conventional wisdom proclaims. In Western Europe, it took centuries for the process of democratization to come to fruition and did not preclude a series of catastrophic wars. In Russia, lacking a vital tradition of capitalism or democracy and which participated in neither the Reformation, the Enlightenment, nor the Age of Discovery, this evolution is likely to prove particularly complicated. Indeed, in the early stages

the process may provide an incentive for Russian leaders to mobilize domestic support by appealing to nationalism.

With all these reservations, the United States and the Atlantic nations have no small stake in a Russia which develops economically and becomes democratic, a Russia which, for the first time in its history, gives priority to its domestic growth rather than seeking security through foreign adventures. They should be patient, but they cannot mortgage the security of Russia's neighbors, or their own, to this quest. For its part, Russia should have every incentive to reverse its historic priorities. Its large armory of nuclear weapons, even if technologically less useful for offensive operations—and perhaps precisely because of that—provides a safety net against Napoleonic or Hitlerian designs on its territory. And even nonnuclear weapons have become so powerful and accurate that old-style wars between major powers grow less and less conceivable.

For well-disposed foreign countries, the thorniest foreign policy challenge posed by Russia is how a potentially powerful country with a turbulent history can develop a stable relationship with the rest of the world. Now reduced to the boundaries of Peter the Great in Europe, Russia must adjust to the loss of its empire even as it builds historically unfamiliar domestic institutions.

The Atlantic allies owe it to Russia to acknowledge that it is undertaking a historic transition and to be helpful where they can. But however sympathetic the Atlantic nations are to this effort, they do themselves no favor by pretending that Russia has already accomplished a process of reform that is only in its infancy, or by celebrating Russian leaders for qualities they have yet to demonstrate. Whether Russia enters the international trading system as a reliable partner will depend to a large extent on its ability to introduce a transparent legal system, a predictable governmental structure, and genuine, rather than oligarchic, market economics. As these goals are approached, Russia's natural resources and its large pool of trained manpower will surely produce a substantial flow of foreign investment.

Some imagine that Europe can assist Russia in its integration

into the international community by acting as the middleman between Russia and the United States. Prime Minister Tony Blair has claimed a role for Britain as "pivot," applying it to the contentious issue of missile defense. Others hint at Russian membership in NATO as an ultimate goal. Still others speculate on Russia's eventual membership in the European Union as a counterweight to either the United States or Germany.

But neither course represents a meaningful option for the next two decades. Russian membership in NATO would turn the Atlantic Alliance into a mini-United Nations type of security instrument or, alternatively, into an anti-Asian—especially anti-Chinese—alliance of the Western industrial democracies. Russian membership in the European Union, on the other hand, would split the two sides of the Atlantic. Such a move would inevitably drive Europe further toward seeking to define itself by its distinction from the United States and would oblige Washington to conduct a comparable policy in the rest of the world. An institutional relationship between Russia and Europe that is closer than that of Europe with the United States, or even comparable to it, would spark a revolution in Atlantic relations—the reason why Putin is so assiduously courting some of America's allies.

Every serious student of history recognizes the importance of a significant role for Russia in the building of a new international order without encouraging it into its historic patterns. At the end of the Napoleonic wars, Europe had faced a similar dilemma. Despite the fear of a resurgence of French militarism, Europe nevertheless succeeded in integrating France into the international system. The Quadruple Alliance—of Russia, Britain, Austria, and Prussia—protected Europe against a militarily resurgent France. At the same time, France was made an equal participant with the members of the Quadruple Alliance in the so-called Concert of Europe, which dealt with the political issues affecting the political stability of Europe.

Some analogous solution is needed for the contemporary international order. NATO must be maintained as a hedge against a

reimperializing Russia. Coincidentally, the industrial democracies should design a responsible system of cooperation with Russia. The political consultative mechanisms within the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) should be strengthened, raised to a head-of-state level, and meet periodically to review the international situation. Russia is already participating in the G-8 heads of state meetings. In this manner, a new order in Europe will be built from west to east and not, as some are urging, from east to west.

TOWARD A NEW STRUCTURE IN ATLANTIC RELATIONS

NATO will no longer prove adequate as the sole institutional framework for Atlantic cooperation. A vehicle for Atlantic cooperation going beyond security is needed to embrace all the nations of the European Union, including those which are not members of NATO, the various institutions of the European Union, and the North American members of the Atlantic Alliance—the United States, Canada, and, in time, Mexico.

A Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area (TAFTA) would serve such a purpose. Initially designed for manufactured goods and services, with negotiations regarding agriculture to follow, TAFTA would accelerate the movement toward free trade to which all the nations of the North Atlantic region are committed. It would also counter the centrifugal forces weakening North Atlantic cooperation and give a new impetus to a sense of common destiny among the nations bordering the North Atlantic.

The conditions are propitious. Labor standards, wage scales, and environmental concerns on the two sides of the Atlantic are comparable. In time, NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement including the United States, Mexico, and Canada) and TAFTA could be merged. At that point, new consultative machinery in the political and social fields would need to be developed to forge closer links between the Western Hemisphere and the European Union. As Russia's economy develops and its internal policy

becomes more constitutional, associate membership for it in such a free trade area would become a distinct possibility.

The realm of political consultation requires the greatest burst of creativity. The central issue is just how much unity the Atlantic democracies need to manage their future, and how much diversity they can stand. It is in America's interest that Europe become a more active participant in world affairs. But it is not in America's interest that this identity be defined in opposition to the United States. An Atlantic Steering Group representing the various components of the Atlantic area should be formed, composed of the United States, the integrated European Union, the European nations not part of the politically integrated Europe, the NATO Secretary General, and the European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. It should meet at stated intervals, backed by a secretariat, to develop parallel approaches to world affairs but also to manage differences as they arise. The membership of this group could also participate in the mechanism for consultation with Russia under the auspices of the OSCE described earlier.

The Atlantic region would, in this conception, be characterized by a series of overlapping circles. On the military side, there would be NATO, together with whatever military force the European Union generates and which, in practice, would have to be integrated with NATO in some manner. On the security side, all members of the European Union must have some kind of NATO guarantee even when they are not part of the integrated command. Whatever the adaptations, NATO would remain as the key security organization. On the economic side, there would be the Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area. Political issues would be dealt with by the Atlantic Steering Group.

It is not an exaggeration to say that the future of democratic government as we understand it depends on whether the democracies bordering the North Atlantic manage to revitalize their relations in a world without Cold War and whether they can live up to the challenges of a global world order. If the Atlantic relationship gradually degenerates into the sort of rivalry that, amidst all its great achieve-

ments, spelled the end of Europe's preeminence in world affairs, the resulting crisis would undermine those values the Western societies have cherished in common.

While many pay lip service to the importance of this goal, there has been no real urgency in dealing with it. The disputes within the Atlantic area are real enough, and many of them—especially in the economic field—involve significant competing constituencies on both sides of the Atlantic. The desire of Europe for a greater identity is valid and, in the long run, also in the interest of the United States. The difficulty is to find a definition of identity that is something other than almost congenital opposition to the United States. A relationship of genuine cooperation implies that the two sides of the Atlantic are willing to modify their immediate short-term interests for the long-term necessities of a broader vision. But as Western democracies are ever more driven internally by short-term considerations, the constituencies for the long term shrink; the political rewards are for actions either which demonstrate immediate benefits or reward short-term passions. It therefore comes down to a question of leadership on both sides of the Atlantic.

While many of these pages have deplored trends within Europe, anyone concerned with the future of Atlantic relationships must recognize that overbearing American triumphalism bears its own share of responsibility. There has been too great a tendency to identify cooperation with concurrence with an American agenda; too much American domestic legislation being applied to close allies in their own countries; too little understanding of the needs of societies adjusting to the loss of their previous preeminence. A more sensitive American policy is essential. But so is a less doctrinaire European one. After all, the task of leaders is to take their societies from where they are to where they have never been.

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The Western Hemisphere: The World of Democracies II

REVOLUTION IN THE REGION

To the extent that political and economic institutions determine the nature of a region's international role, Latin America is comparable to the nations bordering the North Atlantic. Its political systems are democratic; its economies are increasingly market-oriented; disputes between its nations are settled by negotiation or arbitration. Wars between the countries of Latin America are, to all practical purposes, excluded. Occasional border confrontations, such as those between Peru and Ecuador in the 1980s, stand out as throwbacks to an earlier age, unlikely to be repeated in any significant way in the years to come. Arms expenditures as a proportion of the domestic product are lower in Latin America than in any other region of the world. From these perspectives, Latin America—especially Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico—is entering the globalized world and marks a success story for the principles of democracy and free markets. When President Clinton, at the Western Hemisphere summit in Miami in December 1994, proposed a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), he was appealing to this Latin American world.

But there is also another Latin American world that is underde-